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China’s emergence has raised pointed questions about the future of manufacturing in Latin 
America. Once saw as its economic future, the viability of this activity in the region has long been 
challenged by traditional trade theory and, in practical terms, by at least three generations of 
Asian Tigers. China and its “unlimited supply of labor”, rapid productivity growth, scale, and 
extremely interventionist state has brought the practical challenge to unprecedented levels. This 
paper, using mainly descriptive production and trade statistics, looks at the nature of this 
challenge and its implications. It begins by dealing with a central issue: Does manufacturing still 
matter for Latin America’s development? It argues that even though there are other options that 
should be exploited, the region cannot afford to completely turn its back to a well-proven road to 
development. It then moves on to examine the scope and nature of the Chinese challenge. It 
shows that endowments, productivity, scale and the government role, all work together to make 
China a formidable competitor. The importance of this challenge is confirmed by an analysis of 
the trade data, which suggests a small impact so far, but a trend that should make Latin 
American policy makers uncomfortable in their seats. The paper concludes by discussing, in 




China’s emergence in the world market raises pointed questions about the future 
of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in the world’s division of labor. The 
once dominant view that the economic future of the region was in manufacturing 
has long been challenged by traditional trade theory and in practical terms by at 
least three generations of Asian Tigers (e.g. Japan, Korea, Malaysia). China and 
its “unlimited supply of labor”, rapid productivity growth and extremely 
                                                       
1 Background paper for the IADB Report on China. I am grateful to Robert Devlin, Marcelo de 
Paiva Abreu, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, Elio Londero and Jorge Chami Batista for their comments. 
None of them though should be held responsible for the views expressed here.   2
interventionist state has brought the practical challenge to unprecedented levels. 
This paper, using mainly descriptive production and trade statistics, looks at the 
nature of this challenge and its implications. 
 It is divided into five sections, including this introduction. It begins by revisiting 
a time-old question: Does manufacturing really matter for LAC’s development? 
The implications of China’s emergence, including the possible responses, depend 
on the answer given to this question.  It then moves on to examine, in section 
three, what are the challenges posed by China for manufacturers in the region. Is 
it an endowment or technology type of challenge? What about the competitive 
implications of “market socialism”? Section four, using correlations and standard 
shift-flow analysis, looks at past, existing and potential trade impacts on LAC of 
China’s growing presence in the world markets. Does it confirm the severity of 
the challenge? The last session concludes by discussing, in general terms, the 
(difficult) options available to policymakers.  
Manufacturing? 
What the literature has to say? -- One could reasonably expect that, after more 
than half a century since Prebisch (1950) published the “The Economic 
Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems”, the issue of whether 
manufacturing matters would have been settled. Yet, the debate in the region 
seems to go on fuelled, first, by LAC’s poor industrial performance and second 
by the fact that economists have yet to agree on the relevance of the “natural 
resource curse”. 
 A couple of papers by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) seem to have reignited the 
debate, with results that suggested an inverse relationship between natural 
resource and growth. They explained their results mainly on the grounds of 
externalities and increasing returns associated with manufacturing. Even though 
the empirical results were new, the authors were revisiting an old controversy   3
about the links between industrialization and growth.  This controversy was 
never satisfactorily resolved--mostly because of the difficulties in empirically 
identifying the channels through which industry promotes growth--yet policy 
makers and most academics have long behaved as if the issue had already been 
settled.  
Developing countries have been pursing explicitly and implicitly 
industrialization since at least the 1950s, first with import substitution, led by 
Latin America and then through export promotion, led by East Asia. In the 
academia, development has been usually equated with industrialization, and the 
notion that there is a “normal” pattern of development (see e.g. Chenery, 
Robinson and Syrquin 1986 and Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997) that goes from 
agriculture to manufacturing and then services, is still today a deep-seated, 
although not always explicit, belief in the profession. Not so long ago, some went 
as far as declaring the existence of a “manufacturing consensus”, which would 
exist beyond policy issues:  “The main issue between the proponents of 
neoclassical trade policy and its critics is not whether to industrialize but what 
form industrialization should take.” (Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin 1986, p. 4 
quoting Krueger 1984). 
Evidences of this “consensus” are widespread. For instance, developed countries 
are usually referred to as “advanced industrial economies” (e.g. Grossmann and 
Helpman 1994:33) and the notion that manufacturing is the cradle of innovation 
and, therefore, the handmaiden of growth, is very much present in the “new” 
theories of endogenous growth. These theories typically speak of “industrial 
innovations” and of learning-by-doing happening mainly in manufacturing (e.g. 
Aghion and Howitt 1992 and Grossman and Helpman op.cit). Contemporary 
development literature also seems to suggest that industrialization is still the 
way to go, working with models where there are traditional and modern sectors   4
and speaking of “[…] fostering industrial growth and transformation” (Hausman 
and Rodrik 2002, p. 17.). 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), in a well known paper, give perhaps the 
best evidence of, and justification for, the profession’s manufacturing bias. They 
argue “virtually every country that experienced rapid growth of productivity 
and living standards over the last 200 years has done so by industrializing. 
Countries that have successful industrialized--turned to production of 
manufacturing taking advantages of scale economies--are the ones that grew 
rich, be they eighteen century Britain or twenty century Korea and Japan.”(p. 
1003).   One could easily add China to this list, but this is the subject of the next 
section.2 
Sachs and Warner’s results, though, did not settle the issue. Their paper has been 
followed by a number of studies challenging or supporting their findings. 
Lederman and Maloney (2003), for instance, present some evidence that what 
hurts growth might not be specialization in natural resources per se, but high 
concentration of exports in any item. Manzano and Rigobon’s (2001) results, in 
turn, suggest that in the period analyzed by Sachs and Warner (1971-89) the 
problem might have been the “debt-overhang” and not specialization in natural 
resources. None of these studies, though, deals satisfactorily with the fact that 
natural resource specialization might be behind both concentration and over 
borrowing. The link to concentration, for instance, is evident in Stijns (2003), 
whose findings point to a substantial crowding-out of manufacturing by energy 
exports.  
                                                       
2 This is a view that also seems supported by economic historians. As Bradford Delong and 
Summers (1991: 447) put it: “The history of economic growth is often written as if nations and 
industries either seized the opportunity to intensify their specialization in manufactures and 
grew rapidly, or failed to seize such opportunities and stagnated.”   5
Other studies raise the issue of an indirect and negative impact of natural 
resource specialization on growth.  Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett and Busby (2003), 
for instance, find evidence that export concentration on “point-source” natural 
resources (defined as those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base 
such as oil, mineral and plantation crops) “are strongly associated with weak 
institutions which are, in turn, strongly associated with weak growth”(p.4).   
Easterly and Levine (2003) reach similar conclusions. Gylfason (2001) Gylfason 
and Zoega (2002), in turn, look at other channels and their results point to a 
negative impact of natural resource rents on investment in physical and human 
capital, which are key determinants of growth. 
The policy debate-- Even though the econometric evidence seems to favor, 
directly or indirectly, the manufacturing option, the issue is far from settled. 
This, however, has not prevented the “contagion” of the policy debate, where 
one can find quite strong policy statements on the appropriate pattern of the 
LAC’s specialization. De Ferranti et al. (2002), for instance, dismiss pro-
manufacturing and resource curse type of arguments, citing Lederman and 
Maloney (op cit) and relying on the history of successful natural-resource 
abundant countries such as Canada, Australia, Sweden and Finland. The report 
urges Latin America not to turn its back on natural resources, seen as pathway to 
a “knowledge economy”. 
Blum and Leamer (2004), though, offer a different perspective. They share the De 
Ferranti et al. (2002) pessimism with regard to the future of manufacturing in the 
region on the grounds of geography and endowment.  As they put it, “LAC is far 
way, rich in natural endowments and has a tropical climate […]” (p.569). And  
“[…] far away resource abundant tropical countries have great difficulties 
attracting manufacturing activities, other than mundane and labor intensive 
tasks like sewing hems on t-shirts” (p. 540).  But unlike the World Bank, they do 
not think that this is a blessing: “Natural-resource-rich communities invest their   6
resources in land, permanent crops and extractive equipment and very little in 
human capital, which has a very low return on a coffee plantation or the 
equivalent. This creates a barrier to development since once the resource is fully 
developed and further wealth accumulation could only come from growing 
manufacturing, the educational system may not be ready to prepare the 
workforce on the factory floor.” (p. 547)  
They also warn about the difficulties of generating jobs in capital intensive and 
fixed-input (land), resource-intensive activities: “Countries that cannot attract 
manufacturing activities face the very difficult problem of how to find work both 
for new entrants into the labor force and also for the natural-resource workers 
who are inevitably displaced by mechanization.” (p. 546) 
Finally, they dismiss the natural resource success stories as “not completely 
meaningful” to Latin America, inter alia, because countries like Canada, Finland 
and Sweden “may have made a commitment to broad human capital 
accumulation for non-economic reasons prior to the period when the private 
return to human capital exceeded the private return to physical capital” (p.5). 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robison (2002) argue that these “non-economic reasons” 
have to do with the “settler” institutions created by Europeans colonialists in the 
natural resource poor (at least in the way they were perceived at that time), 
scarcely populated and environmentally attractive areas of the new world, as 
opposed to the “extractive” institutions of the tropical, inhospitable and natural 
resource rich regions of the South. 
Even though these contributions are far from exhausting the policy debate, they 
reflect well the two strands of “manufacturing pessimism” that prevails in 
academic and policy circles, particularly in the North. They both, however, seem 
to stand on shaky grounds. The review of the empirical literature made above 
does not support the natural-resources enthusiasm of the first strand. In fact, the   7
evidence seems to confirm the direct or indirect negative impacts on growth of 
natural-resource specialization. The success cases strike more as exceptions than 
rule. Apart from the institutional argument discussed above, the transition into 
manufacturing was a crucial element of their success. They made this transition 
counting on a human capital base that preceded the natural-resource 
development and in a global environment where fragmentation of the 
production processes was still incipient, hampered by transport costs and tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. In other words, they were in better conditions to explore 
linkages and diversify into manufacturing.  
Sure, Chile of the nineties is a “domestic” natural-resource success. Yet, Chile’s 
success (which, by the way, still has close to 40 percent of its exports linked to 
one single product—copper) is dwarfed by the growth, diversification and 
technological sophistication of the “manufacturing” East Asia and is matched by 
Venezuela’s failure, which bears clear symptoms of Dutch Disease.3 But, perhaps, 
even more relevant from a policy point of view is the fact that the bias against 
natural-resource intensive activities, for the overall majority of countries in the 
region, is a thing of the ISI past. Trade liberalization and the hands-off policy that 
prevailed throughout the nineties led these economies to a regime as close to a 
“neutral” system of incentives as it has ever been.  The “don’t-turn-your-back “ 
kind of advice does not seem to have, then, any practical consequence. 
Likewise, the argument of the second strand that LAC’s manufacturing is 
doomed by geography and endowments seems to overlook both important 
pieces of theory and facts. The “new” theories of endogenous growth, which, as 
mentioned above, have manufacturing at their core, emphasize the importance of 
innovation and learning, which, in turn, depend fundamentally on the 
accumulation of human capital. That is, they give pride of place to a type of   8
endowment that might be influenced by the complex interplay of geography and 
institutions, but that also respond to policy.  
  One way of reading these theories is to argue that accumulation of human 
capital and the ensuing process of learning and innovation can change a 
country’s destiny beyond its geography and natural endowments. History has a 
number of examples of this happening, but one of the most telling episodes 
happened in South Korea. After the Korean War, the UN hired specialists to 
consider South Korea’s future economic prospects. The so-called Nathan group 
based their planning (which fortunately was never implemented) on the 
assumption that South Korea export prospects and comparative advantage lied 
in agriculture and minerals! (Krueger 1979, p. 77) 
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3 Houseman (2004), however, disputes this view. However, it seems hard to rule out the Dutch 
Disease hypotheses altogether in a country where oil related exports (SITC 3) account for 80 per 
cent of total exports (2002 data).   9
  One cannot also ignore the fact that after more than a decade of trade 
liberalization, an average of approximately 20 percent of the region’s GDP is still 
produced in the manufacturing sector (see Figure 1) and that countries such as 
Mexico and Brazil are significant exporters of manufacturing goods.  True, the 
manufacturing share of GDP has been declining rapidly; output and exports of 
manufactured goods are still dominated by “mundane” resource and labor 
intensive goods or are concentrated in the labor-intensive links of the value 
chain; and the region has been having difficulties to increase its limited share of 
the world market, being thoroughly outperformed by East Asia (see Lall, 









































































































































































































































log real PPP per capita income
Selected LAC and resource-intensive countries
Figure 2: Predicted and observed manufacturing share of GDP:
Fixed effects regression 
y = 2.281x – 0.1348x
2 – 6.8564 
R
2 = 0.06 
Source: WDI and Penn World Tables 6.1 
 
Yet, there seems to be more to LAC’s manufacturing tribulations than 
endowments and geography.  The declining share of the GDP can be seen, at 
least in part, as an inexorable adjustment to the manufacturing overshooting   10
produced by import substitution policies (ISP).  It might also reflect a fall in the 
relative price of manufacturing goods vis-à-vis services driven by trade 
liberalization.  As show in Figure 2, most Latin American countries have gone 
though a drastic process of adjustment to the “norm”.4 That is, they have 
achieved in the 60s and the 70s a level of industrialization, measured by the 
manufacturing share of GDP, higher than predicted by its per capita income. 
Trade liberalization, mostly in the mid-80s and 90s, seems to have played a part 
in bringing the observed closer to the predicted levels.  
This performance would also be consistent with a region that is living up to its 
geography and endowments. Yet, the performance of other natural-resource 
intensive countries such as Canada, Finland, Sweden and Thailand suggest that 
there might be other factors at play in this convergence.  Not only these countries 
have maintained manufacturing shares systematically higher than predicted, but 
they also show no strong signs of convergence, despite their open trade regimes.  
The exception here is Australia, yet its convergence seems to happen at much 
higher levels of per capita income than in LAC.  
The simple exercise shown in Figure 2 could be more meaningful if the “norm” 
reflected the countries’ size and factor endowments. An attempt in this direction 
is show in Figure 3, which presents a measure of the countries’ deviation from 
the “norm”, taking into account their size (population), endowments of physical 
and human capital, energy and land (see Table A.1 for details). For lack of data, 
the exercise does not cover the nineties, period where trade liberalization was 
deepened in the region; yet, it still produces some useful insights. At first sight, 
the results are consistent with an overshooting and a process of convergence that 
in the early nineties was close or had already gone even beyond eliminating any 
                                                       
4 There are arguably two factors behind the curvature of the norm: faster productivity growth in 
manufacturing than in services, which drives down the relative prices of the former and the 
operation of the Engel’s law which leads to a change in the pattern of demand from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services. See Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997,    11
“fat”. However, since, as we have seen in Figure 1, the share of manufacturing in 
the GDP continued to fall significantly throughout the nineties, it is possible that 
during this period the region’s level of industrialization might have fallen below 
the “norm”. So, convergence and overshooting might not tell the whole story. 
Moreover, judging by the performance resource-intensive countries such as 
Thailand, one is also tempted to think that there is more than “destine” behind 










































































































     See Table A1 for details
Deviations from the 'norm' controlling for resource endowments (1970-1991)
Figure 3: Manufacturing share of GDP
 
In fact, there are least two important “omitted variables” in this story. The poor 
and volatile macroeconomic environment that prevailed in most countries in the 
region throughout the eighties and nineties and a reform of the state which has 
gone well beyond weeding out the excesses of the import substitution era. The 
first variable requires little introduction. LAC has a well-known long record of 
macroeconomic mismanagement and fiscal irresponsibility, and has spent most 
of the last two decades coming to terms with its troubled past. Important   12
progress has been made in this area, but not without costly mistakes, particularly 
in the choice of exchange rate regimes. Long periods of overvalued exchange 
rates in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina have taken a heavy toll 
on tradables in general and on manufacturing in particular.  
The second variable is far from consensual and has to do with the time–old 
polemic about the government role in the process of industrialization.  Most LAC 
governments--as a reaction to the bloated, inefficient state of the years of import 
substitution--have leaned towards an agenda that demonized government 
intervention and, as a result, they have exposed producers in the region to 
damaging market failures. Economists are generally comfortable with models 
that incorporate market imperfections driven by externalities, imperfect 
information and economies of scales and which are particularly relevant for 
industrial development. Yet, they usually balk at policy solutions mainly on 
political economy grounds. Clearly, the record of government intervention in 
LAC has been particularly poor and might justify this attitude. Yet, this poor 
record has a lot to with a closed trade regime and with the fragility of Latin 
American institutions.  As it is well known, much has changed during the 
nineties.  
 In any event, the bottom line is that even a cursory analysis of manufacturing in 
LAC shows that firms suffer from several disadvantages. For instance, they do 
not have access to sufficient financing; they lack the incentives to invest in 
human capital and technology; and more than anything they are up against 
competitors that can count on generous government assistance in all these areas, 
particular in East Asia.  So the history of LAC manufacturing in the last decades 
is the history of an industry which had to shrink and adjust to the realities of an 
open economy and in this process faced unfavorable geography and 
endowments; but it is also the history of an industry which had to grapple with   13
an extremely inhospitable macroenvironment, with a less than supportive 
government and with competitors heavily supported by their governments. 
Against these evidence and arguments, an honest answer to the issue of whether 
manufacturing matter for LAC development is a qualified yes. It is not a matter 
of biasing incentives against natural-resource activities. This would mean to go 
back to the costly distortions of the ISI era. Yet, one cannot ignore the risks 
involved on a pattern of specialization based on natural resources. The 
econometric evidence, although inconclusive, does seem to confirm those risks 
and, at the very least, underlines the advantages of diversification.  The theory 
also seems to give manufacturing a key role in promoting human capital, 
innovation and growth, irrespective of the countries’ geography and 
endowments. So there seems to be enough grounds to urge LAC not to turn its 
back on manufacturing, a sector, unlike natural-resources activities, where 
governments have good reasons to be concerned about market failures and 
foreign targeting. The emergence of China in the world markets, as discussed in 
the next section, not only reinforces this point, but also takes the already difficult 
challenge of developing a strong and competitive manufacturing sector in the 
region to another frightening level.  
The Chinese Challenge 
Why China is a formidable threat for LAC’s manufacturers? There are at least 
four types of challenges.  
Endowments--The first is what can be called the endowment or “Heckscher-
Ohlian” challenge.  With a population of 1.3 billion and a labor force of 640 
million sitting on a limited amount of natural resources, China has a huge 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods. This labor abundance translates 
into wages that are well below the levels practiced throughout most LAC. 
Figures 4 and 5 compare, respectively, current and purchase-power-parity (PPP)   14
manufacturing wages among China, Brazil and Mexico.  The figures for nominal 
wages are heavily driven by movements in the exchange rate: i.e. Brazil’s mega 
devaluations after 1999 and the appreciation of the Mexican peso after the 1995 
crisis. Yet, as it can be seen, even at its most favorable year, Brazil’s wages 
topped China’s by a factor 3 (2002) and in the case of Mexico by a factor of 5 
(1998).  
Figure 4- Average Nominal Annual Wages in Manufacturing:
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, IBGE and INEGI annual industrial surveys  15
Figure 5: Manufacturing Wage Gap: Brazil, Mexico versus China
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Source: Penn World Tables 6. China Statistical Yearbook, IBGE and INEGI annual industrial surveys
 
The PPP data suggest a declining wage gap driven by falling real wages both in 
Brazil and Mexico and rising wages in China. Yet, the difference seems to have 
stabilized in the late 1990s in levels which still give China a substantial 
advantage over the largest and most industrialized economies in the region. 
Moreover given China’s present employment structure (Figure 6), this advantage 
might linger for quite some time to come despite China’s breakneck growth (an 
annual average of 9.3 per cent in 1990-2002, CSY 2003). With 51 per cent of its 
labor force still in the primary sector, China seems to be far from it “Lewisian 
point”, a stage in which rapid manufacturing growth exhausts the excess supply 
of labor in the primary sector and wages start grow faster than productivity.   16
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook
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Productivity-- The second type of challenge is of a “Ricardian” nature since it is 
related to productivity (technology) and not endowments. It could be argued 
that China’s wage advantage, as in the textbooks, reflects the low productivity of 
its manufacturing sector and therefore would not be a competitive advantage. 
Hard facts on productivity levels across countries, though, are difficult to find, 
not least because of the methodological difficulties involved. Mckinsey (2003) is 
one of the rare attempts in this direction and the results do not offer LAC great 
comfort. As shown in Figure 7, labor productivity does seem to be lower in 
China than in Mexico and Brazil in most sectors, but the difference is in general 
substantially lower than the wage gap.  To make things even more complicated, 
the evidence available indicates that labor productivity has been growing much 
faster in China than in LAC, which suggest that latter’s productivity edge will be 
wiped out sooner rather than later.    17






































Figure 8 shows that Brazil and Mexico, despite their good results in the 1990s, 
were totally outperformed by China, which has even increased its lead since the 
turn of the decade.  These results suffer little change when a more reliable ex-
factory deflator (see Young 2003) is used to calculate China’s productivity 
growth. China’s superior productivity performance in the last decade is also 
confirmed by firm level data (Figure 9), usually a more reliable source of 
information.    18
Figure 8 - Labor Productivity in Manufacturing: China, Brazil and Mexico
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Source: statistical offices 
Figure 9 - Labor Productivity at the Firm Level: China, Brazil and Mexico.
Annual Average (%)




Source: Lopez-Cordova and Moreira (2004) and Hu, Jeffeson, Xiaojing and Jinchang (2003)
One might raise the issue that China’s impressive performance might be just the 
result of capital deepening--an increase in the number of machines per worker. 
This possibility is particularly relevant for a country that has been investing close 
to 40 per cent of its GDP. Yet, total factor productivity estimates, 
notwithstanding their huge variance and methodological flaws, do not suggest   19
that China is following in Soviet Union’s footsteps. They tend to confirm China’s 
edge over LAC, although the gap is not always as large as suggested by the labor 
productivity data. 
 Young (2003), for instance, using official national accounts data, estimates an 
impressive 3.0 percent per year TFP growth in 1978-98.  The author argues, 
though, that the use of alternative and arguably more reliable deflators brings 
this result to a moderate 1.4 percent per year. To put these figures into 
perspective some of the TFP estimates for Latin America (e.g. IDB 2001 and 
Loyaza et al. 2002) point to an average negative growth in the 1980s and 1990s, 
although with a large variance among countries. The best performers in the 
region, Chile and Argentina, reached close to 2 percent TFP growth, but that was 
only in the 90s. Young’s 1.4 percent result for China appears to be at the bottom 
of the range of estimates available. Other authors such as Wang and Wei (2004), 
also working on national accounts data, estimate a 2.3 percent TFP growth per 
year, which is a considerably better result given that includes the pre-1978 
reform years (1952-1998). Li (2003), using both national and provincial data, finds 
an even higher estimate, putting TFP growth at 3.4 per cent in the post-reform 
years.  Hyetens and Zebregs’s (2003) estimates are in the 2.5 to 2.8 percent range    
for 1979-89 and within 2.6 to 4.0 percent for 1990-98. Unlike Young, none of these 
authors try to adjustment the official data. 
The estimates based on sectoral or firm level data usually point to higher levels 
of TFP growth. For instance, Jefferson et al. (1999) estimates a 2.5 percent TFP 
growth per year for state and 3.4 percent for collective industrial enterprises in 
1980-92. Jefferson et al. (2000), also using firm level data for manufacturing, 
estimate a 2.8 percent TFP growth per year in 1980-96.  Roughly comparable 
estimates for Latin America usually suggest, with a few exceptions, a more 
modest performance.  On Mexico, Tybout and Westbrook (1995), covering the 
first period of the trade liberalization (1986-90), puts the TFP annual growth at   20
1.8 percent. Lopez-Córdova and Moreira (2004) puts the same figure for the 
NAFTA period (1993-1999) at 1.1 percent.  On Brazil, Muendler (2004) estimates a 
0.4 percent of TFP annual growth during 1986-98, and Lopez-Córdova and 
Moreira (2004) finds annual increases of 2.7 percent for the second half of the 
nineties.  
 
Scale-Alongside endowments and productivity stands the scale challenge. Even 
though China is not (yet) a rich country (its per capita income of close to US$ 
1000 in 2003, put it among the lower middle income countries), it seems to fit   
almost all definitions a large country. The population, as mentioned before, is the 
largest in the world; has a surface that is roughly as large as the United States 
and 15 per cent larger than Brazil; and has a US$1.3 billion economy, which is 
edging closer to the size of the entire LAC economy (US$1.6 billion).  Chinese 
exports, at US$365 billion, are already higher than those of LAC as a whole. The 
PPP figures are even more impressive, putting the Chinese economy only behind 
that of the United States. The largest Latin American economy in PPP terms—
Brazil—is ranked 9th, with approximately 20 percent of the size of the Chinese 
economy. 5 
Apart from the standard advantages of a large country in terms of things such as 
public goods (see Alesina, Spolaore, Wacziarg 2004), its sheer scale gives China 
an important edge in capital and technology intensive industries, because of the 
possibility of: (a) translating high fixed costs (equipment or R&D) into low 
unitary costs; (b) benefiting from the increasing returns associated with learning 
and the creation of knowledge; and (c) overcoming indivisibilities or pecuniary 
externalities associated with increasing return technology (Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989). The advantages of size, which are maximized by the country’s   21
exceptional growth record, also operates as a magnet to foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which boosts investment, brings technology and therefore, reduces China 
barrier to entry in capital intensive and technologically sophisticated industries. 
Since the early nineties China has been ranked as the number 1 destination for 
FDI in the developing world, with flows which reached US$53 billion in 2002 
(See UNCTAD 2003).  
 
The government role--The fourth and final challenge lies on the role of 
government in the Chinese economy. While LAC was busy dismantling the 
interventionist apparatus of the ISI era, China was entering the world market 
with a policy regime that bore all the hallmarks of its East Asian neighbors, 
notably Japan, Korea and Taiwan.  That is, a policy regime that involved heavy 
government intervention in the product and factor markets to support 
industrialization and exports.  The fact, though, that the Chinese regime was 
built upon the foundations of a socialist economy has taken the government role 
well beyond what has ever been experienced anywhere in East Asia. 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a detailed analysis and description 
of China’s policy regime (for that see, e.g. Naughton 2004). Yet, it is worth noting 
that Chinese manufacturing firms, since the inception of the new regime in 1978, 
could count on “perks” such as: (a) an “unlimited” supply of credit, provided by 
state banks, at rates likely to be well below the opportunity cost of capital; (b) a 
public funded national innovation system, which has contributed to diffuse 
knowledge and reduce the costs and risks of R&D (Dalhman and Aulbert 2001); 
(c) a very lax regulation of intellectual property rights, which has reduced the 
costs of imitation and absorption of foreign knowledge; (d) in the case of a 
substantial, though declining , number of firms, a direct access to treasury coffers 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 All figures are for 2002, except for PPP data, which is for 2003. See WDI. The figures for the size   22
guaranteed by their main shareholder, i.e., the Chinese government  and; (e) 
even more generous financial, fiscal and other unorthodox benefits to the 
“national champions”-- firms belonging to “pillar” industries.6 
Chinese firms have also lived under a dual or selective trade regime that would 
grant exporters free access to imported inputs at international prices, but that 
would severely restrict import competition in the domestic market. The regime 
has also been selective in terms of ownership. Foreign firms have received a very 
unorthodox treatment, although not unprecedented by East Asian standards. 
While LAC was adopting national treatment and phasing out local content and 
export requirements, China was marching in the other direction, going as far as 
prohibiting FDI in “strategic“ sectors, though to be the preserve of local firms.  
On the “carrot” side, China has distributed lavish fiscal incentives to foreign 
firms under regimes such as the Special Economic Zones, at time when these 
practices were being considered costly and ineffective in LAC.  
There is no doubt that over the years, China’s policy regime has moved towards 
a more market-oriented approach, particularly after the WTO accession in 2001. 
For instance, China has made a series of commitments to: gradually eliminate 
trade-related investments measures; to unify and liberalize its trade regime; to 
liberalize FDI in sectors such as banking and telecommunication (WTO 2003). 
Yet, there is no sign that China is prepared to go as far as LAC in renouncing 
government intervention. As of the first quarter of 2004, 59 percent of total 
investment was still made by government entities (NBS-China). The financial 
sector continues to be dominated by state banks, which, as pointed out by 
                                                                                                                                                              
of the economies are based on GDPs.  
6 Nolan and Zhang (2002, p.2090) presents a list of those benefits: “tariffs, nontariff barriers, 
including limitations on access to domestic marketing channels, requirements for technology 
transfer and to subcontract to selected domestic firms as the price for market access; government 
procurement policy; government selection of the partners for major international joint-ventures; 
preferential loans from state banks; and privileged access to listings on international stock 
markets.”   23
Naughton (op cit p. 12), “continue to be somewhat responsive to the policies and 
projects of government officials at the national and local levels.”  
Perhaps even more revealing, the Chinese government had no qualms to 
announce recently that it is formally promoting 3 sectors, two of then in the 
manufacturing area: semiconductors, automobile and software (Naughton op 
cit). Not even in the reform of the trade regime, liberalization can be taken for 
granted. For instance, a recent report by the United State Trade representative 
(USTR 2003) has flagged a number of areas where reform has fallen well short of 
what has been promised. Among them trading rights and distribution services, 
import and export regulation, non-tariff measures and national treatment. 
Another worrying sign was given by the European Union, which has denied 
China the status of a market economy (People’s Daily June 30 2004).  
Whether or not these interventionist policies are behind China’s take-off or 
whether or not they guarantee or compromise China’s long-term growth is 
already the stuff of a prolific policy debate, which, as with other East Asian 
tigers, is bound to be inconclusive, not least because economists have yet to find 
a satisfactory way of dealing with counterfactuals.  Yet, from LAC 
manufacturers’ point of view, the omnipresence and generosity of the Chinese 
state has a very practical and immediate implication, which is to heavily tilt the 
playing field in favor of their Chinese competitors, in a scenario where they 
already face endowment, productivity and scale disadvantages.  
 Trade impacts 
Does the trade data confirm the severity of the Chinese challenge? The answer is 
a qualified yes.  Qualified because the assessment of trade impacts involves 
complex general equilibrium issues as well as methodological problems 
stemming from aggregation bias and product differentiation, particularly in the   24
case of manufacturing goods. Yet, having these limitations in mind, the picture 
that emerges is not very comforting for Latina American producers.   
 Shifting  shares--A simple way of approaching the issue is to look at what 
happened to market shares of manufacturing exports in the last two decades.  As 
can be seen in Figure 10, the eighties were disastrous to LAC, which eventually 
staged a recovery in the nineties, driven particularly by Mexico. Yet this recovery 
was not enough to match China’s performance, which by the end of the nineties 
had roughly twice the market share of LAC’s biggest manufacturing exporter, i.e. 
Mexico. The picture also shows the yawning gap between LAC and the East 
Asian Tigers.  








































































































Note: Manufacturing is defined as SITC 5 to minus 68
 
An important issue, which cannot be answered by Figure 10, is the extent to 
which China’s growing market share was built at LAC expense. Figure 11 offer   25
an approximated answer to this question, using an approach suggested by 
Batista and Azevedo (2003). To overcome the lack of data on the elasticity of 
substitution between Chinese and LAC exports, LAC’ losses of market share in 
any product, market and period is attributed to China according to the latter’s 
participation among the countries which gained market share in that particular 
product, market and period. For instance, if LAC looses market share in textiles 
in the US market in the 1990s, this losses will be attributed to China, if China had 
gained market share in that product, market and period. If Korea and China 
were the only countries that gained market share in textiles, and China has 50 
percent of the gains, 50 percent of LAC losses will be attributed to China.7 Given 
that, for the majority of industries, products are highly differentiated, the 
accuracy of this exercise depends heavily on the data level of aggregation.  Yet, 
limitations on data availability for a number of countries does not allow the 
analysis to go beyond the 5 digit level of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). The results, then, particularly at the product level, have to 
be taken with a pinch of salt.  




































jki L  is the loss (current US$) of country j to country k in the product i,  j G is the gain of country j 
in the product i, 
t
ji ms  is the market share of country j in the product i in time t and 
t
i M is world 
imports of good i.   26
 Figure 11 suggests that LAC losses to China in the World Markets in 1990-2002 
were on the whole relatively small, reaching 0.7 percent of the region’s total 
exports in 2002 (US$ 1.4 billion).8 Contrary to what could be expected from a 
cursory factor endowment analysis, the highest losses were not concentrated on 
low-tech, labor intensive goods, but in natural-resource intensive goods, 
suggesting that LAC should be prepared to face competition from China on the 
whole spectrum of factor-intensity goods.  
Yet, it is worth noting that distortions such as the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC)--which freezes markets shares in textiles and apparel in the main 
                                                       
8 See Lall (2000) for details of the classification. There was also a non-manufacturing category 
included in the exercise, primary products, which did not reveal any losses in the period. 
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Source: Comtrade with author's own calculation.  27
world markets--and LAC’s protection of its own low-tech, labor-intensive 
industries might be behind the relatively small losses in the low-tech sector.  The 
end of the ATC in 2005 could drastically change this picture, particularly for 
countries in the region whose industrialization was based on the fragmentation 
of the production process, taking up the more labor-intensive stages of the 
production chain, such as Mexico and countries in Central America (see e.g. 
Condo et al. 2004 and Nordas 2004). 
 Figure 11 for comparing two points in time does not tell much about the trend 
behind the losses.  This is shown in Figure 12 and, as it can be seen, overall losses 
might have been relatively small, but the trend suggests difficult days ahead. 
Figure 11 also blurs somewhat the picture when it averages the performance of 
LAC’s diverse countries and subregions. Figure 13 gives a more detailed account 
of these performances and it is clear that the more resource-intensive countries in 
South America (Andean Community and MERCOSUR) seem to have been the 
more affected. Central America (Central America Common Market-CACM) and 
Figure 12 - LAC's Annual World Market losses to China
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Mexico apparently used preferential agreement and higher MNF protection for 
low-tech, labor-intensive industries as a shield against Chinese competition (see 
Lopez-Cordova 2004).  Yet, annual data shows that Mexico’s and Central 
America losses, as with LAC as whole, have been mounting particularly after 
1999. 
Figure 14 shows that LAC’s most affected markets were outside the region, 
implying that it has yet to suffer the full-blown Chinese impact on its main 
markets, particularly on its domestic market. Reliable data on market penetration 
for the entire region is difficult to come by, but trade flows suggest that China’s 
moderate presence in LAC’s domestic manufacturing market is changing 
rapidly. Figure 15 reveals a rapidly increasing Chinese share of manufacturing 
imports in all LAC’s subregions, which, however, have still a long way to go to 
match the situation in the US manufacturing market.  Data on import penetration 
for Brazil and Mexico (Figure 16) tend to confirm this picture of a small but 
rapidly increasing impact of Chinese imports on local manufacturers. In case of 
Brazil, whereas the country’s import penetration as whole has been declining 
Figure 13-LAC World Market losses to China by selected countries and sub-
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since 1999 maxi-devaluation, Chinese penetration has moved in the other 
direction, increasing substantially, although from a small base. In Mexico, the 
growth of China’s imports has been outpacing that of the rest of the world by a 
large margin since 1999.   
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Fig 14 - LAC's World Market Losses to China by Selected Markets, as a percentage 
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Bilateral Trade--Another way of looking at trade impacts is to assess the volume 
and composition of the bilateral trade between China and LAC. LAC’s exports 
and imports to China boomed since the early nineties, reflecting the market 
oriented reforms in China and in the region. Yet, exports lagged behind imports, 
producing an increasing trade deficit, which reached US$5.7 billion in 2002, 
despite China’s considerably faster growth. This figure hides, though, 
considerable differences among countries in the region, with resource-intensive 
countries such as Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina showing sizeable surpluses 
after 2001. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, the composition of the bilateral trade 
is particularly revealing. Figure 17 shows that LAC’s net exports to China are 
only relevant in primary products. It is marginally positive in manufactured 
goods intensive in natural resources and heavily negative in all the other 
categories of manufacturing goods. So, unlike China’s trade with other 
developing countries in Asia, which is marked by an intensive intra-industrial 
trade (see Lall and Albadejo 2003 and Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and Schindler 
Figure 16 - Brazil's and Mexico Import Penetration* in Manufacturing goods.




























* Import divided by apparent consumption.  Brazil's and Mexico's output data converted to US dollars using, respectively, 
1998 and 1994 real exchange rate          Source:  own calculation based on IBGE and SECEX data.
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2003), its trade with LAC seems to be heavily based on traditional comparative 
advantages, reinforcing a pattern of specialization, which, as discussed before, 
might not be growth enhancing.  
 In fact, as of 2002, LAC’s share of China’s total imports of manufacturing goods 
were a mere 1.2 percent, whereas ASEAN countries accounted for 8.5 per cent.  
One could argue that this is the inexorable result of geography and endowments, 
yet given the characteristic already described of China’s trade regime and taking 
into account that the composition of LAC’s net exports to the rest of world shows a 
much higher share of manufacturing goods, one should at least explore other 
possible explanations. For instance, both Chile and Brazil seems to face a more 
“visible hand” when trying to export more industrialized versions of natural 
resource products. Chile’s has difficulties in exporting refined copper (Claro 2004) 
and Brazil, products such as soy oil and leather shoes (Abreu 2004). Likewise, 
ASEAN success in exporting manufacturing goods to China might be related to its 
engagement in the multinationals’ global production chain and, therefore, they 
face the more liberal, export-processing, version of China’s trade regime. 
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Export similarity  
Whereas shift-share analysis and descriptive trade statistics reveal a great deal of 
information about the past and the present, they do not say much about the 
potential trade impacts. Indices of export similarity can be useful in this regard 
and reveal the relative vulnerability of countries and industries of the region to 
Chinese competition in third markets. Among the several possible indices we 
picked the straightforward coefficient of correlation of the export composition. The 
use of alternative indices such as the Finger-Kreinin export similarity index (Finger 
and Kreinin 1979) does not change the main story. Figures 18 and 19 show the 
evolution of the coefficient of correlation in 1992-2001 of the largest Latin countries 
and sub-regions and China, for exports to the US and rest of the world markets (6 
digits of the Harmonized System).9 
 In both markets the story is very similar and the main drivers of the change seems 
                                                       
9 Changes in the product classification along the period and data availability prevented the use of 
a lower level of aggregation.     
Figure 18 - Coefficient of Correlation for Export Composition
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to be: (a) first and foremost, the rapid structural change of the Chinese economy 
throughout the 1990s--away from natural resources, labor intensive and on to 
capital and technology intensive goods, and its impact of the composition of 
exports; (b) the relative dynamism of the high-tech manufacturing sector in Mexico 
and in the CACM, driven by preferential trade agreements and; (c) little structural 
change and a export composition heavily based on natural resources or resourced-
based manufacturing goods in countries such a Chile, Brazil and in subregions 
such as the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. 
 For instance, the high share of oil in total Chinese exports in the early 1990s is 
behind the relative high initial correlation shown by Mexico and the Andean 
Community. As China becomes a net importer of oil along the decade and 
becomes heavily specialized in the exports of manufacturing goods (initially labor 
intensive, low-tech goods but gradually shifted into more capital intensive, high-
tech products), this correlation shifts into a declining trend.  In the case of Mexico, 
the correlation starts to rise again in the mid-nineties, mainly in the US market, 
driven by the export boom and the change in composition towards more high-tech, 
capital-intensive goods associated with NAFTA.  
Figure 19 - Coefficient of Correlation for Export Composition
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CACM experienced a similar pattern in both markets, but later in the decade and 
driven by FDI in sectors such as semiconductors, in countries such as Costa Rica.  
Brazil and Mercosur start with a relatively high correlation in the US market, 
based on the exports of resourced-based and low to middle-tech goods, but since 
they do not follow China’s move up the technology and capital-intensity ladder, 
this correlation falls sharply along the decade. Their correlation also declined in 
the other markets, but given the lower share of manufacturing goods in exports to 
the rest of the world, the correlation was consistently lower than in the US market 
throughout the period.  Finally, Chile’s heavy reliance on natural-resource goods 
puts the country among the least vulnerable to Chinese competition in the region. 
These movements on the level of direct competition with China become clearer 
when the main driver of the changes, i.e. manufacturing, is isolated. Figures 20 and 
21 present the same correlation index between LAC and China for the US and the 
Figure 20 - Coefficient of Correlation for Export Composition
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other markets, but taking into account only manufacturing goods.10  As it can be 
seen, this approach underlines: the rise of Mexico and CACM to the position of the 
most vulnerable countries in the region, in both markets; the declining 
vulnerability of Brazil and Mercosur and the very “safe” position of Chile and the 
Andean community.   
Though relevant, these figures should be interpreted with caution. True, Mexico 
and CACM are the most vulnerable in the region, particularly because they rely 
heavily on industries such as apparel, textile and electronics where China has huge 
comparative and competitive advantages. The more so, because they specialize on 
stages of the production chain that are highly labor intensive and can easily go 
east. Their shallow network of suppliers and relatively low technological 
capabilities add even more credibility to this threat. But the position of the other 
countries does not look comfortable either. If one accepts the premise that 
diversification into increasing return, human capital and technology-intensive 
                                                       
10 Definition based on the usual SITC classification (sectors 5 to 8 except for the sub-sector 68), 
Figure 21 - Coefficient of Correlation for Export Composition
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industries is good for growth, what they are seen is an increasingly congested field 
ahead, not least by China, which calls into question their prospects of a more 




Is there a future for manufacturing in Latin America? One thing we can say for 
sure is that China does not make this future any brighter.  The combination of 
endowments, scale, fast productivity growth and an omnipresent state makes of 
China a formidable competitor to Latin American manufacturers and raise many 
questions about their future.  This is particularly true in a world market already 
overcrowded by at least three generations of Asian Tigers and facing the 
prospects of others, such as India, to come. As Blum and Leamer (2004, p.569) 
put it “[…] the world is awash in countries competing to do mundane 
manufacturing tasks and that route towards progress is foreclosed by 
overcrowding.” 
This prospect would not be reason for concern if we could say, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, that manufacturing does not really matter for growth and 
development.  Yet, both theory and evidence seem to suggest otherwise, at the 
very least, for the opportunities of diversification involved. The risks of a pattern 
of specialization based on natural resources are there for everyone to see, 
including with very concrete examples in the region.  True, there are success 
stories, but they seem to be exceptions based on particular historical and 
institutional environments. This does not mean that the region should “turn its 
back” to natural resources or any policy of that sort. It just means that, on the 
basis of the evidence available, the region would be ill advised to renounce to a 
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well-proven road to prosperity, no matter how treacherous this road has become 
with the emergence of China. 
Even if we leave China apart, the future of manufacturing in LAC is usually seen 
with pessimism on the grounds of geography and endowments. The tribulations 
of the sector on the last two decades seem to corroborate this view.  Yet, 
geography and endowments do not tell the whole story. First, there was the 
legacy of the ISI era, which promoted industrialization beyond any economic 
rationale and underinvested in human capital. Second, there was the decades of 
macroeconomic volatility that were particularly costly to the tradable sector and, 
finally, there was the overreaction to the excesses of government intervention, 
which left manufacturers vulnerable to market failures and foreign targeting.  
These are all policy-related factors and both theory and history give us hints that 
well-designed policies, backed by strong institutions, can overcome the 
restrictions imposed by endowments and geography. To put it differently, 
policies might change the endowments that matter for industrialization and 
growth, such as human capital and technological capabilities.      
 If seen through these lenses, the Chinese challenge might still look daunting, but 
not insurmountable. It all depends on the region’s ability to pursue a policy 
agenda, which should aim at: a) the consolidation of the macro stability anchored 
on fiscally responsible policies and institutions; b) the formation of a large 
regional market to reduce de disadvantage of scale, particularly for the smaller 
countries, an issue where regional agreements might play a crucial role; c) the 
relaxation of excruciating credit-constraints on local firms, which are up against 
highly-leveraged Chinese firms; d) the enhancement of frail local technological 
capabilities (i.e. human capital), not only to boost productivity, but to increase 
the region’s ability to differentiate its products and diversify its investments into 
externality prone and growth enhancing activities.   38
Of course, this is easier said than done. As Stigltiz (2002, p.50) put it, 
“Unfortunately, we can say more about what is needed, than we can about how 
to create what needs to be created.” There seems to be no doubt, though, that, to 
meet this challenge, the region will need a much more pragmatic approach to 
government, than it had during the nineties. It seems also clear that for a region 
with such a variety of country sizes, endowments and institutions, there must be 
a fair amount of “self-discovery” in policy-making, i.e.: “The specifics of how this 
[fostering industrial growth and transformation] can be managed is likely to 
differ from country to country, depending on administrative capability, the 
prevailing incentive regime, the flexibility of the fiscal system, the degree of 
sophistication of the financial sector, and the underlying political 
economy”(Hausmann and Rodrik 2002, p.17). In other words, to a large extent, 
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Table A-1.Median Regression: Manufacturing Share of GDP (in log). 
Explanatory Variables (in log)          
         
Real PPP Per capita income (RPPP)  1.71      
   (0.3293)***     
Square of RPPP  -0.0955      
   (0.0198)***     
Capital stock per capita  0.0485      
   -0.0354      
Labor Force  0.0773      
   (0.0113)***     
Crop land per capita  -0.0664      
   (0.0222)***     
Pasture land per capita  0.0141      
   -0.009      
Forest land per capita  0.0108      
   -0.0113      
Share of pop. with some tertiary education  0.0715      
   (0.0243)***     
Share of pop. with some secondary education  0.0327      
   -0.0347      
Share of pop. with some primary education  0.1315      
  (0.0268)***     
 Share of pop. with no education  0.0072      
 -0.0229       
Energy stock per capita  -0.0345      
   (0.0107)***     
Observations   275      
Countries 67       
 Pseudo R2   0.3647      
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** significant at 1%        
Controls included year dummies        
Data on endowment from Antweiler and Trefler (2000). Data on Manufacturing Share 
from the WDI and data on per capita income from Penn World Tables 6.1    
 
 